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Shri K. Subrahmanyam (1929- 2011), was the doyen of 
Indian strategic thinking and had a clear and farsighted 
vision on issues ranging from foreign policy to nuclear 
deterrence. An intellectual progenitor of the Indian nuclear 
weapons programme and the most influential strategic 
thinker of his own and the subsequent generation.
In a long and distinguished career that began with his 
entry into the Indian Administrative Service in 1951, 
Subrahmanyam straddled the fields of administration, 
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an unparalleled felicity. It was his early advocacy of India 
exercising the option to produce nuclear weapons that 
made governments and scholars around the world sit up 
and take notice of his views.
He was the Founder-Director of the Institute for Defence 
Studies and Analyses (IDSA), and served in that capacity 
from 1968 to 1975. He returned to IDSA in 1980 and 
nurtured it to become country’s premier think tank with 
focused research on defence and foreign policy issues.
Subrahmanyam chaired several Government committees 
and commissions of enquiry, notable among them being 
the enquiry commission of the 1971 Indo-Pak war and 
the Kargil review committee in 1999. A major revamp of 
the Indian intelligence system took place based on the 
recommendations of the Kargil review committee.
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Strategic Parity for Peace: 
engaging china in the 21St century
By Onkar Marwah1
The Proposition 
The India-China relationship is likely to be the most complex, perhaps 
the most competitive relationship between two of the world’s mega-
states in the twenty-first century. Their cooperative interactions will 
be edgy and formal, often brittle - irrespective of public professions 
to the contrary. Presently, the military and economic might of China 
is substantially higher than India’s, but this will be of less relative 
significance after the next 10-to-15 years – provided that, in this 
intervening period, India’s strategy is ‘smart’, selective, and consensually 
sustained by insulation from ad-hoc re-direction or neglect due to the periodic 
democratic changes of our political dispensations. Beyond the 15-year 
period, and given the preceding, India can – despite its governance 
1 The maps used in this paper have been taken from the internet without verifica-
tion of actual boundary lines. They might not conform to official Indian bound-
ary lines. Any oversight in this matter is regretted and was the result of the fact 
that the author was unable to obtain official Indian maps for the purpose of this 
paper.
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and implementation deficits – acquire relative-sufficiency in military, 
technical and economic wherewithal to be able to confront China 
along the full spectrum of strategic, political and economic challenges. 
The Challenge for India
The task for India is to traverse from 2015 to 2030 without falling 
victim to, (1) domestically, our self-imposed shortfalls, (2) regionally, 
China’s military and diplomatic programs and stratagems, and (3) 
globally, the consequences beyond our control of interplays in the 
International System. To achieve our strategic national objectives, 
the need is to implement interlinked policies simultaneously and 
parallel along all the three preceding separate vectors; be sensitive 
to their different step-level functions; and factor in their variation 
in time-scales for composite and maximal results by 2030. That is 
the least needed to measure up to the challenge posed by China’s 
authoritarian, determined, top-down, well-planned and coordinated 
framework of national policies.
Preliminary Comment
We in India normally undertake ‘Defense Analysis’ not ‘Strategic 
Analysis’ when attempting a study of our security needs in relation 
to other countries. The emphasis in Defense Analysis is primarily 
on interactions in military terms. Strategic Analysis, on the other 
hand, encompasses: International Systems Theory, History, 
Geography, Sociology, Politics, Economics – and in this day and age, 
an understanding of Ecology and the Environment, Information 
Systems, even on occasions, an understanding of the Psychological 
and Anthropological premises of the subject in review.
The second issue of importance for us in India is to be able to base 
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our understanding on Indo-centric premises and not those derived 
from alien constructs of Indian conditions. India and China are 
original civilizations which grew and flourished independently 
of other regions. In the case of India, we have to divest ourselves 
of sweeping Western over-riding tags such as: caste-ridden, other-
worldly, fatalistic, non-materialistic, etc. While the preceding forms 
are part of our social and religious patterns, they are not absolutes 
in themselves to the exclusion of other traits. Indians can be very 
humane, egalitarian, aspiring, this-worldly, rational and materialistic 
– as is only natural in relation to any complex society’s behavioral 
reality. Over time, and overall, India has been a very high-achieving 
and tenacious culture and civilization. It is to its positive attributes 
that we must now draw attention, not merely search, trawl or 
breast-beat about its negatives – as most Western sociologists, 
religious scholars and philosophers have invariably done. We need 
an indigenous historiography and sociology of India instead of 
relying on others’ yardsticks and theoretical constructs to understand 
ourselves. Unfortunately, so far this does not exist. One hopes that 
future generations of our scholars will take up these tasks.
I will, initially, take a detour through some of my own understanding 
of India’s political and cultural history in analyzing our past 
interactions with the world – particularly Asia and China – as would 
appear relevant and necessary to our present and future needs in fashioning 
our polity, our society, as well our evolving national strategy and security 
objectives. 
Introduction
India and China are the only two, and the longest continuous, 
civilization-states in recorded human history. They have also through 
STRATEGIC PARITY FOR PEACE: ENGAGING CHINA IN THE 21ST CENTURY
4
all the centuries been home to concentrations of large populations 
– and, therefrom, the most consistently productive agricultural and 
manufacturing self-sufficient societies for meeting the material needs 
of great numbers of settled peoples. It is only around the eighteenth 
century – with the onset of newer forms and techniques of production 
that their comparative positions in per capita and gross GDP declined 
(See chart below2) 
The relative fall in India/China GDPs was precipitated by a variety 
of factors: a resurgent Europe and its colonial conquests and/or 
worldwide control and influence; internal wars and dissensions; 
innovations in warfare weapons and techniques; newer learning and 
knowledge-based applications to the management, organization, 
structure and function of human Society and the political State. 
The New Modern World
Why the ‘modern’ world as we know it was born in a little island 
off the coast of northwest Europe - then spread to the rest of Europe 
and eventually around the world - is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Western historians, sociologists, geographers, even anthropologists 
and philosophers, have expounded a variety of theories: the 
‘natural’ epochal rise and decline of societies; the uniqueness of the 
‘Western’ experience deriving from Greek democratic inspiration 
and Roman law and administration; the smaller sizes of European 
states preventing massive centralized authoritarian control; 
racial superiority (white over the brown, yellow and black races); 
unregulated mercantile intra-trade among the European states, 
giving rise to a free-wheeling growth of business entrepreneurship; 
a spirit of bold adventurism and thirst for discovery of the unknown 
2  Source: Angus Maddison. University of Groningen. Reproduced from, 
Visualizing Economics.com
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among the blonde and the blue-eyed; or, Western ferment for constant 
change and progress in contrast to the ‘unchanging East’ as Marx 
described Asia; and so on. 
The preceding Western theory and praxis of world achievements 
ignores the fact that, for almost fifteen hundred years Europe was a 
non-achieving backwater in history. It is a justifiable claim that many 
of the forerunners of later European success were transmitted to 
them by the Arab/Islamic civilization – even those nurtured by the 
Greeks and Romans – while Europe itself lay in thrall to the dark 
grip of a harshly-conceived biblical/ecclesiastical diktat (‘the earth 
is flat’; ‘it was created in seven days by God’; ‘the Sun travelled 
around the Earth’). Confession and repentance to heresy – or death 
by torture and burning at the stake - was the price to be paid for 
questioning such divinely-ordained ‘facts’. In turn, it may seem 
appropriate for it to be acknowledged that many of the scientific 
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and technological feats attributed to the Arab/Islamic civilization 
were themselves transmitted to West Asia from India and China 
(e.g., ‘Arabic numerals/decimal system’ which the Arabs themselves 
colloquially term ‘the Hindu numerals’, or ‘Jabr-i-Hind’ for Algebra; 
‘Damascus steel’ which originated as ‘Wootz steel’ from India; or 
gunpowder and paper-making from China). A fair assessment of 
how many scientific, technological and knowledge-based processes 
flowed from the East to the West over millennia – unheralded and 
unpaid for over the ages when there were no patent-regimes – still 
awaits systematic research by scholars, especially when emanating 
from India, since that has already been done for China3. It was 
frequently, though not only, from the latter civilization-states that 
a vast fund of original learning and techniques in all the arts and 
sciences as well the philosophies of man flowed for fifteen hundred 
years from East to West.
The Parallel Historical Experiences of India and China
One might ask: why is it necessary or indeed useful to take this detour 
through a political analysis of history, sociology, philosophy, or the 
so-called social sciences for understanding our world - particularly 
the world of India and China? The reason is that the angst, perhaps 
the pain,  is deeper and more scarring in these two civilization-states 
than in other countries overwhelmed by the European colonial and 
civilizational onslaught – primarily because self-belief in the superiority 
3 Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China, (1954) seven volumes 
published out of a 27-volume project - now under the aegis of the Needham 
Research Institute at Cambridge University.  See also, Rajiv Malhotra, The Infinity 
Foundation (infinityfoundation.com). Malhotra is singlehandedly attempting 
to accomplish the same in a systematic way, now, for India’s past science and 
technology contributions – since the latter country has never been fortunate 
enough to have a dedicated scholar such as Joseph Needham, toiling away in 
university cloisters over twenty years, to chronicle its achievements.
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of their own systems are so ingrained over millennia of unbroken success. 
While both India and China had suffered repeated earlier foreign 
invasions, all these previous invaders were essentially ‘Nomadic 
Warriors’ who had belabored the ‘Settler Societies’ of India and 
China. These nomadic armies had usually arisen in Central Asia and 
periodically moved to wage their campaigns in different directions 
against the riverine human settlements of India, China, and the 
Tigris-Euphrates settlements – as well into the Dnieper-Volga-
Danube-Elbe river-regions of Europe.4 Nothing could stand against 
the nomads’ mobile, horse-mounted warfare techniques followed 
by repeat victories everywhere. These Central Asian warriors were, 
nonetheless, viewed as uncivilized ‘barbarian hordes’, eventually 
to be absorbed into the local cultures and societies. The same, with 
similar absorption-results happened to them in Europe where 
Mongols, Huns, Visigoths, Tartars and Turks from Central Asia 
ravaged large swathes of territories. According to some historical 
accounts Mongol armies went up to the river Seine in present-
day France. It is to these marauders that we owe the pejorative 
descriptions of Germans as ‘Huns’, of Russians as ‘Asiatic hordes’, 
or in references to the ‘Terrible Turk’ and ‘Vandals’ in European 
literature.
The Differing Historical Experiences of India and China
Returning to India and China, there is one marked difference in their 
Nomadic-Warrior-Invasion experiences – and these have had a varying 
impact on their respective histories which is relevant till today. Nomadic 
armies from Arabia, thereafter Central Asia – newly-converted to the 
strongly-inspired faith of Islam – began moving East and West around 
4 Stuart Legge: The Heartland. New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1971.
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the eighth century. Between the tenth and fifteenth centuries their 
assaults on and then partial control of India – geographically nearer to 
West Asia – had become steady and relentless. By the early sixteenth 
century newly-Islamic Mongols/Moghuls arrived to rule most of India 
till the early 18th century. Despite the preceding events, indigenous 
Indian resistance to the ‘foreigners’ was subdued but not exhausted or 
extinguished. Islam spread within the Indian population also, and all 
its adherents – foreign and local - became part of the warp-and-woof 
of Indian society. No similar ingress and absorption of a crusading and 
composed medieval civilization’s forces took place in China’s case. 
The West comes East, 1750-1950
Beginning around the 1500s, Europeans had also appeared as 
traders and merchants in Asia - initially in India. For the succeeding 
two hundred and fifty years they functioned mainly as sea-faring 
merchants or freebooters, importing goods from India – and later 
from elsewhere in Asia – to Europe (while militarily protecting their 
trade from Saracens/Arabs, pirates and rapacious local potentates). 
It is only by the mid-eighteenth-century – as India entered a period of 
country-wide ‘warlord’ turmoil following the weakening of the Mongol/
Moghul Empire, that European traders saw opportunities for territorial 
aggrandizement. Over a hundred-year period from the 1750s of 
slow, steady but artful political chicanery and superior warfare – 
first against European rivals, then against the fragmented rulers of 
India’s ‘ancient regime’ - the British eventually emerged victorious. 
By 1850 they had absorbed the last independent Indian kingdom 
of the Punjab into their Indian possessions. Soon thereafter, in 
1857, the most serious and widespread nationwide revolt against 
a European power of the nineteenth century was mounted in India 
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against the British.5 After a welter of vengeful killings lasting over a 
year – a bloodier nineteenth century revolt against colonialism than 
anywhere else in the colonial wars of the nineteenth century - the 
British re-emerged in control to absorb all of India into their new 
‘Empire’ as a ‘Crown Colony’.6 Precisely ninety years later, in 1947, 
the British exited from India after Mahatma Gandhi’s uniquely 
peaceful Independence movement. Unlike earlier invaders, the British 
came to India as foreigners and – always few in numbers – also departed 
en masse as foreigners. 
China’s experience in this respect was entirely different. Its indigenous 
heartland had seen many invasions by Nomadic Warriors, but was 
never invaded by a strongly-inspired civilization’s military forces. It had 
constructed the famous Great Wall – on the frontiers of what was 
considered China’s territory - to stem invasions by northern, southern 
and western ‘Barbarians’. There were no eastern barbarians, as in 
that direction lay only the sea – except for the Japanese, referred in 
Chinese writings as the (savage) ‘dwarf warriors’. The Wall, however, 
was unable to hold back the Mongol/Manchu nomadic armies (See 
Map below).7
5 Amaresh Misra, War of Civilizations: India AD 1857. Delhi, Rupa. 2007. See, also, 
Edward Thomson, The Other Side of The Medal, New York: Harcourt, Brace & 
Co, 1926 – one of the few accounts by a British author drawing attention to the 
events and atrocities committed by his countrymen in 1857.
6  Ibid. Misra suggests that the number of Indian dead in the disorders of 1857 may 
have been as many as ten million. While the figures may be doubted as no count 
of the killed was kept by the defeated, it is difficult to challenge the immense 
scope and scale of retribution exacted by the British, as provided in Misra’s book.
7  See Map 1, ‘China Core and Periphery’, showing geographic-defensive alignment 
of the Great Wall.
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Indeed, China suffered frequent bouts of pillage, plunder and 
‘foreign rule’ at the latters’ hands. As in India’s case, the foreigners 
became ‘locals’ over time – except when the foreigners wanted to 
distinguish themselves from the local population, e.g., the Mongol/
Manchu rulers, who imposed the hairstyle of the long ‘Q’ on the 
whole (Han) Chinese population as a sign of the latters’ servitude 
and second-class status (similar indignities were imposed by foreign 
rulers on India’s indigenous peoples). 
China’s Mongol-Manchu-Qing Rulers and the West, 1850-1911
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries China’s Mongol/Manchu/
Qing rulers conquered, in a series of genocidal military campaigns 
against mainly the Zunghars (another Central Asian nomadic empire 
and peoples), almost two-thirds of what is now considered Chinese 
territory: Manchuria, (inner) Mongolia, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Tibet and 
Taiwan. Prior to these relatively recent ‘imperialist’ wars the aforementioned 
territories were never under long term or extended Chinese rule.8
When Western sea-farers appeared of Asian coasts China was - crucially 
in marked contrast to India - a functioning centrally-administered state 
controlled by the (foreign) Mongol/Manchu/Qing Emperors – who ruled 
from 1644 to 1911. In the early stages, the Chinese opened some of 
their ports for trading with the newly-arrived ‘long-nosed western 
barbarians’ – but later sought to close them as greater concessions 
verging on China’s territorial sovereignty were demanded. Even 
though weak against the modern arms-and-war-making techniques 
of the Westerners, the Chinese were – as a functioning state with 
8 See Map 1, ibid. Also, read, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central 
Eurasia, by Peter C. Perdue (Harvard University Press, 2009); and, Taiwan’s 
Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures 1683-1895, 
(Harvard University Asia Center, 2004) by Emma Jinhua Teng.
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a centralized administration - able to resist and avoid a nationally-
injurious devolution of concessions or control to the former. It should also 
be noted that strong western pressures were mounted on China a century 
later than in India’s case – by the 1850s rather than in the 1750s. India 
had been disorganized with no real central authority between 1750 
and 1850 - but China remained as a formally-centralized state right 
from 1644 to 1911 under the foreign but indigenized Manchus. As a 
consequence, China was able to preserve its ‘independence’ despite 
enforced trade-and-concession-related ‘partitions’ by the western 
powers (later including Japan). It, therefore, escaped coming under 
complete western imperial control as India had been rendered. That 
China was, nonetheless, no better placed post-1850 to resist Western 
modernized arms-and-warfare than India had been post-1750, is 
attested by the ease with which Chinese/Manchu armies were easily 
and speedily defeated by the Western interlopers in the few military 
engagements that took place between them. Indeed, compared to the 
new Europe, China was discovered to be as backward 1850s onwards 
as India had been in the 1750s.
India’s Peaceful Spread in Asia 
There is one other experience which is unique in the India-Asia-China 
context. The peaceful spread of Buddhism from India to the whole of East 
and Southeast Asia over a thousand years – preceded earlier by unknown 
hundreds of years of the spread of Hinduism into Southeast Asia – must be 
seen as one of the more remarkable ‘peaceful spread of influence’ movements 
in human history (See Maps below).9
9 Source for both maps: Wikipedia
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Dark orange: The Indian subcontinent. Light orange: Other countries culturally linked 
to India, notably Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Champa(Southern Vietnam), 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei and Singapore. Yellow: Regions with significant cultural 
Indian influence, notably Afghanistan, Tibet, China’sYunnan Province and the 
Philippines. (Also, not shown, Fiji.)
Source: Wikipedia.org
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Map: Chola Empire and Voyages 1130CE (Source Wikipedia.org)10
10 The Chola Kings had the first blue-water and long-ranging commerce-related and 
naval expeditionary flotillas in the Indian Ocean region - including a marine 
corps, underwater sea-saboteurs, flame-thrower weapons, as well compasses and 
similar instruments for accurate navigation. They voyaged all along and through 
the South-and-East Asian waters by way of China, up to Korea, and beyond. 
They also traversed westwards to the Gulf region and the East African coast. 
Chola ships were large sea-vessels constructed in watertight sections to avoid 
sinking the entire ship in case a section was holed. The ships were constructed 
in shipyards spread along the present-day Tamilnadu state. (Kalinga – present-
day state of Odisha; and later the Maharattas on the western seaboard of India, 
also deployed commercial and naval forces). The Chola expeditions and voyages 
took place in the 10th to 12th CE, i.e. about 400 years before the better-publicized 
voyages to the Indian Ocean region of Chinese Admiral Cheng He in the 15th 
century. It should be noted that Cheng He sailed hugging the coast all along 
during his voyages and did not venture into the open seas. It is a further fact 
worth recalling that Vasco D’Gama’s celebrated ‘discovery of the sea route to 
the East’ was also undertaken hugging the African coast all the way round to 
southeast Africa – from where, assisted by Indian pilots and escorted/protected 
by six Indian commercial vessels much larger than his, he ventured into the 
open sea and made landfall in Kochi/Kerala. See: Nagapattinam to Suvarnadwipa. 
Reflections on the Chola Naval Expeditions to Southeast Asia. Eds. Hermann Kulke, K. 
Kesavapany, Vijay Sakhuja. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. 2009. 
(abstract from the book): “The expansion of the Cholas from their base in the 
Kaveri Delta saw this growing power subdue the kingdoms of southern India, 
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The concomitant cultural, religious, social, linguistic, artistic, 
artisanal, thought-and-psychology processes, et al., accompanying 
their millennial-plus extension into such a vast area and to such 
large, vibrant populations, has been dubbed by one writer as ‘an 
imperialism without tears’.11 China was itself a major recipient of this 
‘peaceful imperialism’. The same writer speaks of ‘Sun cultures’ that 
radiate and Moon cultures that absorb - and that Asia has always had 
‘two Suns in the Sky’.12 An eminent Chinese historian has termed it 
the ‘Indianization of China.13 Nothing of a like category or process 
has ever flowed to India from China. Further, it has been suggested 
that the ‘Soul’ of China is the Universal State while the ‘Soul’ of India 
is the Universal Society’.14
Despite the preceding cultural, religious, artistic and sociological 
as well as occupy Sri Lanka and the Maldives, by the early eleventh century. 
It was also during this period that the Cholas initiated links with Song China. 
Concurrently, the Southeast Asian polity of Sriwijaya had, through its Sumatran 
and Malayan ports, come to occupy a key position in East-West maritime trade, 
requiring engagement with both Song China to the north and the Chola kingdom 
to its west. The apparently friendly relations pursued were, however, to be 
disrupted in 1025 by Chola naval expeditions against fourteen key port cities 
in Southeast Asia. This volume examines the background, course and effects of 
these expeditions, as well as the regional context of the events. It brings to light 
many aspects of this key period in Asian history. Unprecedented in the degree of 
detail assigned to the story of the Chola expeditions, this volume is also unique in 
that it includes translations of the contemporary Tamil and Sanskrit inscriptions 
relating to Southeast Asia and of the Song dynasty Chinese texts relating to the 
Chola Kingdom”.
11 Francis Watson, “Two Suns in the Sky”, Encounter, December 1966, pp.40-48.
12 Ibid.
13 Professor Hu Shih, The Indianization of China. Cambridge, Mass. Harvard 
University Press, 1937.
14 Amaury de Riencourt, The Soul of China. New York. Harper, 1958; and, The Soul 
of India. New York: Harper, 1960.
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flows, geography, mountains, deserts and long distances had 
separated the deeply contrasting worlds of India and China - so 
obviating any occasion for political contact or territorial-military 
clash between the two. This changed only and abruptly in the mid-
twentieth century when China – re-constituted, following a period 
of violent war-lord and civil-war turmoil between 1911 and 1949 - 
emerged as a strong, proud and belligerent Communist State which 
swiftly moved to take control of all its sovereign land – and to reclaim 
all its (foreign imperial) Mongol/Manchu-conquered territories. For the 
first time in their long histories, this brought the ‘universalist state’ 
of China to the traditional borders of a troubled, partitioned, but 
relatively peaceful  new India - equally  proud of itself and especially 
so in having achieved its independence by a uniquely pacific process 
unknown and untried at any stage in world history.
Since then, the Long Engagement between the two equally-proud 
civilization-states has entered a territorial and possibly an extended 
militarized phase – accompanied by their profoundly-clashing belief 
and political systems. Given their contrasting societal zeitgeists, 
there is little chance of either subsuming or overwhelming the others’ 
long-held self-images of uniqueness, longevity and ‘imperishability’. 
According to one philosopher, it would be easier to contemplate 
the earlier probability of the ‘Ruins of Washington’ than an India or 
China converted to one another’s world-view.15
The Strategic Proposition from History 
The proposition from this short political analysis of Asian history is 
that India-China relations will be strongly if subliminally attentive 
15 Austin Coates, China, India and the Ruins of Washington. New York. John Day, 
1972.
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to the respective self-images of the two countries and all their 
interactions in the twenty-first century, for the following reasons:
•	 The primal sensibilities of India and China remain unyielding 
to all and each other despite their turbulent vicissitudes 
or unbroken roll-calls in history. Both are imbued with 
‘Middle Kingdom’ hubris – perhaps Indians subdue theirs, 
the Chinese do not. 
•	 India influenced Chinese thought, art, religious behavior and 
civilization. Nothing of a like nature was transmitted from 
China to India. Indians pay no homage to the Confucian 
ethic – or China - as some East Asians do. In some sense, the 
Indian idea of centrality based on universal thought, learning 
and wisdom, being of the mind, is more imperishable than 
the Chinese one based on terrestrial supremacy.  
•	 India transcended its negative European colonialist 
experience through invoking the superior morality of the 
Gandhian route to national freedom, 1947. China, only 
partially impacted by western imperialism, achieved 
liberation through the fire and carnage of a 30-year civil war. 
•	 In strategic-speak: India’s freedom struggle had to be created 
in the context of a completely organized and militarized 
imperial control of all India’s territory. It was Gandhiji’s 
special genius in inventing the instruments of satyagraha 
and non-cooperation which openly in conditions of imperial 
control created millions of volunteer ‘guerrillas without 
arms’, eventually to immobilize and render impotent the 
military might of the foreign empire. In China’s case, perhaps 
the only choice possible amidst countrywide internal chaos 
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was for an armed guerrilla campaign conducted with military 
redoubts, long marches and violent struggles by Mao Tse-
tung’s vast peasant armies. 
•	 The premises of the newborn elan and inspirations of the two 
countries were and are, therefore, radically different, devolving 
from the separate realities of their long past and their objective 
liberation experiences. India chose to predicate its new image 
with priority given to the negotiated and peaceful achievement 
of national and international objectives. China was ready to 
place a premium on the use of force wherever and whenever 
its negotiating terms met resistance.
•	 The two, being whole self-contained civilizations albeit in 
the form of states, have been prone to insularity along with 
conceptions of their ‘self-sufficiency’. They have accepted 
change only when forced to do so, or when change became 
patently unavoidable. In consequence, the two states had 
very little normal political or social interaction historically 
in the past given their biases, distances and geography. The 
same mutual if simple ignorance is the reality today - leading 
to caricatures and, vicariously, as many negative as benign 
images of each other. 
China’s ‘Reconquista’ of Tibet, 1950
Like the rest of the world, including all the major powers, India had 
few options but to acquiesce rather than confront New China’s re-
annexation of the earlier Manchu-conquered Tibet. A face-off with 
Communist China’s huge armies, built during and experienced 
over 30 years of civil war, was beyond the capabilities of newly-
independent India’s armed forces – largely demobilized after WW2 
STRATEGIC PARITY FOR PEACE: ENGAGING CHINA IN THE 21ST CENTURY
18
as well as split with Pakistan. Moreover, The Indian Army had few 
Indians trained to Staff levels – the British had studiously kept them 
below Colonel’s rank, with only three or four having risen to the 
level of Brigadiers. Indeed, Brigadier K.M Cariappa (one of the few) 
had been hurriedly raised to General’s rank after Independence to 
command the Indian Army.  
While being fully aware of the negative impact on India’s security 
by China’s sudden military presence on our northern borders, 
the Indian Government’s decision to seek a negotiated settlement 
with China was politically the rational course taken in India’s 
constrained circumstances.16 The only other option would have been 
to seek ‘alliance-protection’ and uncertain active support from the 
Americans and the British – the latter two hostile to but themselves 
wary of entangling with the new China. Since then, many analysts in 
hindsight have surmised and debated what seeking military support 
from the Western powers would have entailed for India. At the very 
least it would have led to a weak and still-poor India’s immediate and 
subsidiary enmeshment on the side and in the disputes of yesterday’s 
‘imperialists’ – soon after gaining Independence! The decade 1950 to 
1960 also witnessed Western-supported military coups in many third 
world states, including in neighboring Pakistan. India had guarded 
itself against the possibility of a similar internal military takeover 
by being extra cautious in relations with the major Western states - 
and by the further strengthening of civilian control over its military. 
Separately, while Stalin’s excesses were known and abhorred, there 
was no intrinsic ill-will against the Communist states. Indeed, the 
16 Lorne. J. Kavic, India’s Quest for Security. Defence Policies, 1947-1965. Berkeley, 
California. California University Press, 1967. This is one of the few studies 
assessing India’s dilemmas objectively in relation to China and the world in the 
initial years of the country’s independence.
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Soviet Union was admired for its earlier swift industrialization, 
which had created the wherewithal for its major role in the defeat of 
Nazi Germany. There was also a sentiment in favor of China which – 
despite its adoption of communism – was adjudged as another Asian 
victim of western intrigue and imperialism. Fiercely nationalistic, 
Nehru spoke about ‘making the history of our choice’ after decades 
of foreign control. 
India’s Strategic Interaction with China, 1950-1962
In the event, India’s basic strategy was to negotiate with China on 
the premises of the Tibet-border cartography inherited from the 
British. As the Himalayan shatter-belt region had, earlier, never been 
demarcated on the ground – neither by pre-British Indian rulers 
nor pre-Communist Chinese rulers – that seemed the only logical 
basis available. Nor was it misplaced: British Indian cartography 
was largely predicated on accepted principles of international 
jurisprudence or customary local practice. In the Eastern Sector 
(NEFA/Arunachal Pradesh) the so-called McMahon Line relied on 
the watershed principle. In the Western Sector (Ladakh) – where no 
natural watershed areas existed – the boundary, known as the Johnson 
line was drawn based on natural topographic realities and customary 
norms as obtained between Tibet and Ladakh/Aksai-Chin. Crucially, 
the adjoining Xinjiang region conquered earlier by Manchu-ruled China 
had never included the areas bordering Ladakh/Aksai-Chin.
It was easy for China to label these Indian border-lines as the result of 
imperial legerdemain. India could have no answer to that charge as, 
on the ground, they had been delineated by the British. The Chinese 
themselves had no superior or impartially-created claim line, or 
indeed any line – but the charge of following colonial practice put India 
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on the negotiating and diplomatic back-foot. The Chinese had now the 
flexibility to move between the political and the legal frameworks 
of negotiations – or to ignore either or both. Meanwhile, whether by 
accident or artifice they were suspected of implementing a process of 
creating ‘facts on the ground’. Chinese patrols had begun to be seen 
frequently in areas deemed by India as lying within its boundary 
line. While perplexing to India, the precedent was nothing new – 
Chinese literature often refers to the employment of such stratagems 
as a useful part of overall surreptitious moves against adversaries. 
India’s recourse to similar tactics could not be hidden from the public 
domain for long in an open political system. It came to be termed as 
the resort to a ‘Forward Policy’. For a while the ‘game of checkers’ was 
undertaken by both sides. This suited the Chinese as in the world’s 
media it could be depicted as ‘aggressive’ Indian actions based on 
earlier-imperial boundary delineations against a ‘reasonable’ China.17
Assessing choice-making as part of policy-formulation, and 
irrespective of ‘who started it first’, – and impossible to verify, - 
17 It stands to reason: if the borders were undefined for us, they were also undefined 
for the Chinese. They had unilaterally built their Tibet invasion route through the 
undefined Aksai Chin area - without our knowledge or negligence, it does not 
matter. They had no better idea – and more so, no superior right – to assume 
that the undefined area(s) intruded into by them – in Aksai Chin or anywhere 
along the whole Indo-Tibetan border from west to east – belonged to Tibet. At 
the earlier Simla Conference in 1912-14, the  Chinese representative had initialed, 
then refused to sign, the border document between Tibet and British India as he 
would not accept the McMahon line demarcation – but that did not mean he had 
or had presented a superior historical counter-claim-line to show on the ground, 
than the one proffered by the British-Indian representatives. No one – certainly 
not the Manchus - had ever drawn boundary lines in these areas. The Chinese 
representative probably did not sign because, at the time, he would not sign – yet 
another - ‘unequal’ treaty’ irrespective of its contents, with a western imperial 
power. One wag has suggested that it was the guile of the member of China’s 
ancient ‘I.A.S’, i.e, the 1600-year old Chinese Mandarinate who, at Simla, used 
the old bureaucratic trick of first initialing then later repudiating-by-not-signing 
the border-agreement document!
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neither side could be expected to supinely accept the ‘forward’ actions 
of the other beyond a certain limit. The Chinese had deceptively 
prevaricated on presenting their boundary demarcations – then as 
now. Eventually, they put forward a political proposal: India to give 
up claim to Aksai Chin (through which the Chinese had built an 
invasion route to Tibet) in barter for China giving up claim to the 
NEFA/Arunachal Pradesh area. Coming on top of their perceived 
‘creeping annexation’ policy, China’s ‘barter’ proposal was seen in 
India as adding insult to injury: being asked to surrender one part 
of its land for retaining the other.18
With limited options, the Indian leadership, in consultation with 
its few diplomatic and intelligence advisors, took a gamble: a last 
throw of the dice as it were, with the rejection of the ‘barter’ proposal 
premised in the hope of the two sides’ penny-packet ‘forward’ 
military pickets factually stabilizing the border on the ground - on the 
assumption that the Chinese would not raise the stakes to the next level.19 
18 No more cleverly tendentious a work has done as much vicarious and ultimately 
‘permanent’ harm to the public perception of India’s legitimate case concerning 
its northern borders, than Neville Maxwell’s, India’s China War (Pantheon Books, 
1970). (His latest is a repeat statement of Indian ‘aggressiveness’ having initiated 
the current DBO fracas, in the Economic and Political Weekly, May 11, 2013). In 
essence and in a quietly disingenuous way, the book pitches the open 1962 India-
China war’s self-flagellating Indian discourse and selectively-chosen (and, with 
spurious rigor, well foot-noted) documents of the Indian side, against the bland 
public and self-exculpatory statements of ‘innocent aggravation’ being thrust 
upon the Chinese government. All Indian professions and protests are doubted, 
discounted and dismissed; all Chinese official statements are taken as gospel 
truth. Maxwell’s whole enterprise is undergirded by the reality of a varying and 
peripatetic British-Indian cartography – which itself, by definition, can only be 
suspect of imperial design and deceit in a post-imperial world.
19 The phrase ‘India’s Forward Policy’ and Prime Minister Nehru’s oft-quoted, but 
inadvertent and hurried remark, ‘… I have asked the Army to throw the Chinese 
out…’ (while emplaning for a tour) have become, over the years, iconic synonyms 
for a barrage of criticism on India’s ‘fool-hardiness’ and ‘arrogance’ in contrast to 
the ‘reasonable’ Chinese. It is forgotten – not least by Indian critics and analysts 
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In the event, the Chinese did raise the stakes, leading to and resulting 
in the military debacle of 1962. After the action, China withdrew its 
forces from the aggressed areas – but has maintained and increased 
its claim on the territories in dispute.20
The Strategic and Policymaking Lessons from the Events of 1962
Newly-independent India had chosen uncharted waters in preferring 
autonomy in its foreign relations after decades of colonial servitude 
– but that was entirely in consonance with its civilizational self-image 
(and remains so today). Its complete preference for democracy over 
dictatorship – and against suspected western machinations to 
install ‘men on horseback’ as leaders in third world countries - was 
inscribed by locking its armed forces under strong civilian authority. 
Given great-power hegemonic demands and siren calls; India’s own 
Partition and attendant massacres; internal dissensions; religious 
divides; and the massive but relatively-smooth integration into the 
– that the Chinese had also resorted to the same ‘creeping annexations’ on our 
northern borders soon after their invasion and occupation of Tibet in 1949. As to 
who started it first is not only moot but impossible to verify – nor does it matter. 
It was a ‘game’ that both sides resorted to playing. India’s signal failing was in: 
being initially alarmed, then rising in tardy and confused offense, thereafter in 
undertaking a bravado-attempt at ‘freezing’ China’s steady ‘creep’ into historically-
undefined mountain areas, but without equivalent military capability, strategy, 
deployment or organization. There is much to criticize in India’s responses at the 
time – but not for the reasons adduced by Neville Maxwell.
20 Henry Kissinger’s, On China (Penguin: 2011) reveals more frankly and drily 
– perhaps admiringly - how and why in realpolitik terms Chairman Mao and 
his cabal assessed and executed the 1962 war. (Read, for a short understanding, 
Ajit Mohan’s and Gordon Chang’s reviews of Kissinger’s book, respectively: 
‘Kissinger’s China, India’s Neighbor’, Wall Street Journal, Blogs, 23/09/2011; and, 
‘Compromised: Henry Kissinger’s China syndrome’, World Affairs Journal, July-
August 2011). It was, in essence, a ‘Middle Kingdom’ approach that inspired 
them, not the minutae of border adjustments. That, it would seem, is – when 
powerful - China’s enduring approach to all states – and would appear to 
continue today.
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Union of 650 semi-independent princely states (one-third of India) 
– while simultaneously impressing democratic control on a proud 
military which had often served as a semi-independent expeditionary 
force of the British Empire – must be judged as an unparalleled 
achievement. 
What India failed to do was to steadily upgrade its Army’s capabilities 
in line with the type and nature of the increasing military threat on its 
northern borders, i.e., from the early 1950s onwards. After the Korean 
War in 1953, the synchronized format of China’s military tactics, 
supportive propaganda and ‘peoples’ war-making strategies were 
known to all. No lessons on these counts appear to have been 
imbibed by India. In the aftermath of the 1962 events, India had 
sought purchase of weapons from the US and Britain – which the 
latter offered tied to a Kashmir settlement favoring Pakistan. In any case, 
the weapons sought or offered – high-performance aircraft and the 
like – may have seemed attractive, but aerial power employed against 
any renewal of the border conflict with China could only presage 
a further Indian escalation of the level and dimension of conflict. 
China could also respond with air-power – on Indian cities from 
Tibetan bases – against which India could not retaliate by attacks 
on far-distant Chinese urban centers. China had used local terrain 
knowledge, human intelligence, portable mobile artillery and mass-
assault techniques to out-maneuver and overwhelm the ill-equipped, 
static and untrained-in-mountain-warfare Indian forces. It is capability 
commensurate with the preceding form of conflict that India needed 
in the aftermath of 1962 - and not shiny aircraft and the like.  
India had a 12-year alert from 1950 to 1962 for undertaking precautionary 
measures against a possible threat from China following the latter’s re-
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occupation and manifestly harsh policies in Tibet. There were enough 
indicators of China’s hardline approach in relations with all and 
sundry. It had intervened with more than a million ‘Chinese Peoples 
Volunteers’ against UN forces and fought them to a standstill in 
Korea; scorned Indian leaders as ‘lackeys of imperialism’; resorted 
to an incessant coastal bombardment on Taiwan/Republic of China; 
and derided the US as a ‘paper tiger’, even dared to face the latter’s 
threatened use of nuclear weapons against it. During the same period 
China engaged in ideological disputes with the Soviet Union, biting 
the hand that then fed it. To have ignored all these signals of Chinese 
resolve on assumptions that their leaders would pay deference 
to fellow-Asian India armed only with friendly gestures, was not 
misplaced as sentiment – it was simply wrong against a powerful 
adversary suddenly squatting at the door.  
To be fair, India did wake up and re-cast its defense policies in 
the aftermath of the 1962 war – without compromising its national 
civilizational-based autonomy. When western arms were denied 
without concessions over Kashmir, India had turned to the Soviet 
Union for the purchase of weapons-systems, including the local 
production of MIG-21s - as well civilian heavy-industrial plant and 
machinery which also had been withheld by western suppliers. This 
new relationship forged with the Soviet Union was the one great strategic 
success for India. It paid dividends in stalemating Pakistan in the 1965 
war, in defeating it in 1971, and in simultaneously laying the first 
foundations for heavy industrialization of the country. 
The lesson from the preceding is that one smart strategic move even 
in adversity can open the avenue for multidimensional success. 
Forging a relationship with the Soviet Union despite the loaves, 
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fishes – and knives – on self-serving conditional offers from the 
western countries was one such beneficial national policy-choice by 
India. Internally, close relations with the Soviet Union disarmed and 
neutralized India’s then militant left-wing groups, leading over time 
to their conversion to routine participation in the country’s electoral 
processes. Externally, it alerted the western powers that India would 
not be coerced easily or subverted into playing a subsidiary role in 
worldly designs or quarrels created by them. It also allowed for the 
first modern heavy industrial plants to be constructed in the country.
Fortunately for India, China itself was embroiled in varied forms of 
internal turmoil throughout the sixties, seventies and eighties: the 
break with the Soviet Union; the Cultural Revolution; the Great Leap 
Forward, followed by a terrible famine which – we now learn - led to 
30 million dead; the mysterious death of veteran Marshall Lin-Biao 
in a plane crash, and the imprisonment of Liu Shaoqi; the Red Guard 
Movement along with the forced dispersal of millions of educated 
youth to work in the countryside; the death of Chairman Mao, leading 
later to the imprisonment, trial and deaths of the ‘Gang of Four’; and 
much more. In consequence, while increasing its grip on Tibet, China 
turned inward – and so did India. There was little interaction of any 
consequence between the two states in the interregnum. 
India’s Thirty Lean Years, 1960-1990
While many things happened, nothing much happened during 
this period apart from two wars with Pakistan, the second of these 
leading to the dismemberment of the latter – with a fundamental 
strategic change in India’s favor. Economically, India’s autarkic 
self-sufficiency model along with State control of the ‘commanding 
heights’ of the national economy, had imposed a regime of slow 
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growth bordering on economic stasis on the country. It also created 
the so-called ‘license-permit raj’; a vast inefficient Public Sector; 
and a stunted Private Sector forced to seeking gains by working the 
system through deals with government functionaries. Apart from 
Minister C. Subramaniam – assisted by able scientists such as Shri 
M.S. Swaminathan – ushering in a ‘green revolution’ and making the 
country self-sufficient in food-grains, the country lived and survived, 
with the energies, innate entrepreneurial spirit, productivity and 
creativity of its people in albeit democratic shackles.
Despite its shortcomings, the choice for autarky and a leading role for 
the State in allocating national resources and revival need to be seen 
as natural corollaries of India’s continuing and permanent search for 
National Strategic Autonomy. Close relations with the Soviet Union 
did not lead to the ‘sovietization’ of India. Distended relations with 
the western powers did not lead to permanent ruptures, and support 
such as the latter were willing to offer, continued to be accepted. A 
start was made with the indigenous production of a limited number 
of major weapons-systems. The autarkic model of development did, 
nevertheless, deliver striking advances in areas related to science, 
technology – and indirectly to preparing the ground for acquiring 
unconventional defense capability. Among the largest pools of 
scientists and technologists in the world was created in India. Their 
talent and acumen became available to the nation across all fields 
of modern scientific endeavor - including and especially, in defense-
related work in the areas of atomic/nuclear, space, electronic and precision-
instrumentation applications. 
Externally, there were two significant strategy-plays by international 
actors or states negatively impacting India’s national security which 
the country was powerless to prevent – or towards which it chose 
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not to undertake any measure of countervailing action. One was 
the clandestine smuggling of nuclear reprocessing technologies 
and plant to Pakistan via the A.Q. Khan network. The other was 
the sustained and surreptitious transfer of nuclear-weapons design 
– some reports also include the facility of secret warhead-testing 
at Lop Nor – along with sophisticated missile-systems by China 
to our neighbor. These transfers were known to the intelligence 
agencies of major states – which monitor all such lethally-sensitive 
and internationally-proscribed ‘trade’. Both categories of preceding 
activities ultimately centered on and led to the denouement and 
strengthening of the China-Pakistan axis.  
At the time, and in realpolitik terms, there were counter-security 
options available to India. One could have been the pre-emptive 
destruction of Pakistan’s under-construction plutonium reprocessing 
facilities – apparently such recourse was suggested by some foreign 
states, along with aid to mount the air sorties. The other was, in 
riposte, to extend robust arms and secret nuclear-related support to 
a country such as Vietnam – which, in 1979, had suffered a Chinese 
invasion similar to India’s in 1962. Neither of these options was 
exercised by a pacifist or perhaps a passive India still hoping for a 
negotiated peaceful settlement of the lingering border dispute with 
China. Assessing such inaction in a positive manner, India may have 
chosen wisely to limit the scale of Pakistani hate and the level of 
Chinese ire in the long term. A further possibility is that India chose, 
or received the accidental benefit of its size, resources and economic 
growth to out-distance Pakistan in multiple other ways - while also 
assuming the burden of measuring up asymmetrically, quietly and 
slowly to China’s increasing ‘comprehensive national strength’ which 
included nuclear weapons. 
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Whatever the interpretation attending India’s strategic choice-
making in the preceding instances, the factual outcome is that the 
country now has to deal with two nuclear-armed adversarial and 
potentially collusive neighbors on its northern and western borders 
– and, as we have discovered since, along its southwestern and 
southeastern Ocean approaches. Geographically and geopolitically, 
therefore, India is beset with multi-directional and multiple threat 
environments requiring step-level and all-Forces integrated defense 
planning (See Maps below).21
 
The GOI has created an Integrated Defense Planning Staff, and it is to be 
hoped that the three Services are engaged in preparing joint operational 
plans along the varied-in-time-and-operation threat-vectors rather than, 
as previously, working within their separate functional silos.
China’s String of Pearls
21 China’s String of Pearls available at www.cominganarchy.com and The New Big 
Game available at www.temi.repubblica.it 
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India’s Fragile Twenty ‘Prosperous’ Years, 1990 -2010
Most economists were aware by the end of the 1990s that India’s 
autarkic model had become severely dysfunctional. It was unsuited 
to delivering growth and prosperity at a rate required to meet the 
needs of a burgeoning population. The crisis came in the shape of 
India - left with barely three-weeks’ of foreign exchange for imports 
end-1990 – having, under duress, to pledge then airlift its dwindling 
gold reserves to a London depository for receiving an IMF loan 
covering further external purchases. Under an astute but still under-
rated Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s political hand, his Finance 
Minister Manmohan Singh began the process of dismantling the 
dirigisme national economic controls system. Soon, with just a limited 
pull-back of the governmental regulatory processes, entrepreneurial 
activity began to deliver increasingly better economic growth. The 
results are there for all to see. Further opening up of the economy is 
currently stalled for political reasons – but the route map, as earlier, 
is known to all analysts. We have to hope for and await the next 
stages of the reform-and-economic-liberalization process to resume.
 In strategic terms, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao also – quietly 
but definitively – changed the contours of India’s interaction 
with geographically-near neighbors to our east and west. A ‘Look 
East’ policy presaged a positive economic - and the initiation of a 
strategically-formulated - interaction with the ASEAN states. To 
the West, hitherto low-keyed and hidden interactions with Israel 
were raised to open-recognition levels – without deterioration 
in the traditionally stable relations with other West Asian states. 
Both moves have provided India with greater strategic flexibility: 
potential new nascent allies to the East and West; and in Israel’s 
instance, the availability of specialized weapon-systems denied to 
us in the past. Additionally, India’s ‘new economy’ has given us 
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internally the resources and funds and externally the heft – and all 
major states the allure – to forge policies on a new plane. India has 
acquired the wherewithal internally so that it is no longer externally 
the impotent recipient of others’ choices, designs or diktat. It is in a 
position to bargain with all on a more equal footing. We owe much 
to the unheralded Narasimha Rao for our present economic status 
and strategic flexibilities.
The International Economy 2.0: Understanding the Role of 
the US Dollar Post-2010 and its Impact on India’s Strategic 
Autonomy. 
The ‘American-European Financial and Economic Crisis’, beginning 
2008 and impacting the rest of the world by 2010, has exposed the 
postwar-created underlying structural imbalances and inequities 
of the international economy. India has been a major victim of the 
fallout, with significant negative impact on its pursuit of national strategic 
autonomy.  
The postwar Bretton Woods agreements installed the American 
Dollar as the world’s prime reserve currency, giving the US unbridled 
recourse to the creation of fiat paper-money – which it has utilized to the 
hilt. Economists such as John Maynard Keynes and Robert Triffin (the 
latter, incidentally, my Academic Tutorial Advisor at Yale University 
in 1966) had favored an internationally-denoted-and-impartially-
controlled reserve currency (‘Bancor’) under the aegis of the newly-
established International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. They 
had opposed the arrogation of unilateral ‘reserve-currency’ power 
by one country. The US, however, had prevailed. Since then the 
whole world has and is continuing to pay the price of acquiescence to such 
financial power in the hands of one country. It has allowed the US and 
allied and collaborating junior-partner Europe unrestrained access 
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to creating (since 1974) un-backed-by-gold, paper money, thereby an 
at-will credit economy domestically; as well the consequent paper-
power to buy up anything from anywhere in the rest of the world. 
This immense heft still exists, and remains at the root of the West’s 
continuing fierce reluctance to implement a neutrally-conceived 
international reserve-currency system. We have to understand the 
strategic impact now of such a world-financial unequal state of affairs – 
negatively on us and, simultaneously and accidentally, to the great benefit of 
China after Deng Tsiao-Ping changed the economic fortunes of his country 
by redirection to ‘Market-Socialism’ in 1979. 
China in its new economic avatar only repeated the export-oriented 
development-format of postwar Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Singapore – indeed, Deng Tsiao-Ping had consulted with and been 
advised frequently to that end by Singapore’s Minister-Mentor Lee 
Kwan Yew. There was one difference: China was a 1000-pound gorilla 
compared to the earlier East Asian exporter-states, enabling it to implement 
the new ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’ policies with the natural 
advantages of its size, potential and authoritarian structure. China 
invited the world to invest in large, carved out and so-designated 
‘special economic zones’ along its seaboard on easy unrestricted 
terms. For both political and economic reasons, the US responded 
first to the ‘opening up’ of China with alacrity; then the Europeans 
followed, somewhat slower and more warily. All expected to reap 
cost-of-production benefits, and thereby the expanded sale of their 
manufactures within China and in the world via employment of 
China’s potentially vast pool of inexpensive labor – and over the 
years they did so on an equally vast scale. 
China already had an earlier national policy of prototype copying and 
duplicating weapons and other machinery supplied by the Soviet Union 
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during the Maoist era, e.g., the immense NORINCO defense-and-
prototype production facility established in 1980 near Beijing. This 
policy has been carried forward and continues to be followed with 
rigor since the Deng- era reforms. As a general rule, most imported 
manufactured items, big or small, are reproduced, resulting in 
‘indigenizing’ of pretty much everything, lethal or nonlethal. Thus, 
along with the immense marketability of its now-competitively-
priced products, the unit-scale-and-cost of production under one 
roof could also be greatly increased, leading to still-higher price-
competitiveness against rivals. Through a policy of inviting foreigners to 
produce, then copying and indigenizing for export, China set up a virtuous-
cycle for itself to become the ‘factory of the world’. Framing the whole was a 
policy, possibly intentional, of predatory international ‘mercantilism’ – buy 
less from and sell more abroad. In the event, millions of China’s rural 
population migrated to the economic zones and improved their 
livelihoods. Factory employment gave them higher incomes than 
before as peasants - even if their salaries remained low in comparison 
to western wage structures. Cumulatively and steadily over the period, 
huge international currency reserves in the trillions were accumulated, re-
invested mainly in US-dollar-denominated Treasury Notes, then used as 
backing for the monetary supply and expansion of the Yuan at home. The 
‘strong’ Yuan could now be manipulated either to subsidize or provide easy 
credit, as required, to its export-driven national manufacturing engine.22  
Neither the Americans nor the Europeans were unhappy with China’s 
national and international financial and manufacturing coordination 
22 China, along with Hong Kong held approximately US$4 trillion as foreign-
exchange reserves. Along with the Euro and other ‘hard’ currencies, its total 
disposable hard foreign-currency reserves could be as high as $7 trillion. See: 
continuing updating on Fair Currency Coalition Fact Sheets at faircurrency.org. 
India foreign-exchange reserves amount to about US$300 billion.
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(Japan had done something similar in its postwar miracle-revival 
phase and also maintains large dollar reserves). It provided the West 
an extended bonanza of cheap consumption goods; while China’s 
depositing external earnings with the US/Europe provided a base 
for the latter to increase their own feat-dollar/euro ‘international’ 
money-supply - as well embark on a credit-generated speculative 
and spending spree. Such a ghostly ‘world money structure’ based 
on the whim and exclusive financial fancy of one state is, in essence, 
no more than a giant Ponzi scheme, and only needed one major 
defaulter to collapse the whole. That came in the shape of Wall 
Street’s ‘masters of the universe’ Lehmann Brothers bankruptcy in 
2008. Since then, the rest of the world has been victim to the fall-out, 
and must watch powerlessly and helplessly as the US/Europe and 
new interloper China – scorpions in a bottle, as described by some 
analysts – circle each other uncertainly, unable to embrace politically 
or divorce economically. 
The economic hence the strategic impact on India, having played within 
the Western ‘fixed’ rules, is incalculable. In one measure, it is our fault 
that the attempt at establishing economic zones for large-scale thus 
low-priced manufactures in India degenerated into land-bank scams 
– and except in a few cases, has been abandoned. By another measure, 
a manufacturing base could have been planned and implemented 
around the same time and of the same class and size as China’s to 
provide for local supply of goods and earnings in foreign exchange 
on a stable basis – within our means and policy constraints. Instead, 
we relapsed into complacency and remained satisfied with the 
early returns from foreign sales of our limited foreign-exchange 
earners, such as from the accidental growth in the workforce of 
computer-programmers, or our generic drug-makers – in both 
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whose competence government policies had little part to play. The 
third major leg of our fortuitous access to foreign earnings has been 
provided by way of remittances from our poor working abroad. 
We beguiled ourselves into a ‘Services-Sector’ model of economic 
growth, ignoring the inevitable commensurate need to provide the 
major portion of manufactures internally for our large population. 
Separately and additionally, China’s relentless growth in high-scale 
production of cheap-goods-exports gutted and rendered stillborn 
any potential Indian entry in the same area of activity – for internal 
purchase or external sale. 
As a result, our current foreign exchange earnings – or stock of 
US$300 billion in foreign-exchange reserves - remains extremely 
modest relative to need. It keeps us teetering perennially on the 
edge to pay the increasing sums demanded for just two of our major 
import items: Oil and Gold (the third being, ironically, electronic 
goods mainly from China). The situation is tantamount to being 
clothed in an economic and hence a virtual strategic straightjacket. 
Foreign exchange shortfall on just these two accounts at any time 
and for any reason would assuredly, and respectively, lead to: chaos 
in the whole national economy; a return to bullion smuggling and 
increased criminality; or cutbacks in other essential-import products. 
Borrowing for such needs is possible, but can only be a temporary 
and an inflationary measure. Meanwhile, India’s current foreign debt 
has ballooned to US$400 billion, i.e., US$100 billion more than our 
foreign exchange holdings. According to me, we are in an economic 
situation similar to 1991. 
While the Western ‘fixed’ international economy rules persist, only a 
much higher and steady means of earning substantial foreign exchange can 
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provide us with the means to maintain strategic autonomy, enlarge our strategic 
space and allow creation of strategic parity with our adversarial northern 
neighbor. China has achieved its strategic autonomy by the ability to 
buy anything from anywhere by the means and methods described; by 
indigenizing both its civil and military manufacturing base; and creating 
thereby its strategic space in the global commons even as its per capita 
income-levels remain modest by western standards. Meanwhile, with 
its substantial reserves of the West’s ‘ghost money’ China has ensured 
forced entry into the tent of the ‘fixers’ as a co-collaborator in maintaining 
the ‘value’ and international economic role of the US Dollar.   
It should be noted that China is attempting to create an ‘international 
reserve currency’ role for the Yuan. For all the preceding reasons, 
India should neither support nor participate in using the Yuan for 
international payments. Better the known vagaries of the US Dollar 
than entrapment in the risks associated with the financial opacity of 
the ‘paper junior dollar’ of an adversarial authoritarian regime.
Restructuring India’s Political Economy, 2015 - 2030 
The same bedrock of economic strength as China’s is still achievable 
by  India within its available means, its special constraints, and the 
functional environment of its democratic framework – provided certain 
choices are prioritized and implemented despite the vagaries of an open 
political system. To realize the preceding goal the master framework must 
envisage success within the time-frame of a fifteen-year period following our 
General Elections, 2014.  Otherwise, India will grow secularly, of course, but 
continue to be the victim of the ‘fixed’ international economic and financial 
system as earlier described. Floundering in slow and uncertain growth, its 
options will remain confined to patch-work and ad-hoc responses in meeting 
recurring crises – inadequate foreign funds, speculation on the value of 
the rupee, and internal price inflations. China, meanwhile, will continue 
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to outdistance us economically while immanently and unpredictably 
threatening our territorial integrity at will.
In a presentation such as mine, only the broad policy lines can be 
enunciated. The latter’s underpinnings are premised on existing 
realities and not on ideal norms. I list them below in brief under the 
acronym ‘AIME’, i.e. Agriculture, Infrastructure, Manufacturing, 
Education (inclusive of Health). Primary policy focus on the preceding 
four areas will automatically lead to a spread-multiplier impact on the 
whole national economy. Econometric analyses can show the high 
unfolding spread-effect on the whole economy by concentrating 
effort and clearing the obstacles in these four areas of investment. 
It would be India’s version of an interlocking virtuous-cycle of national 
development despite the ‘fixed’ international financial system. Let me also 
immediately state that the selected thrust-areas of activity are not 
an original statement.  Many planners and economists wiser and 
superior hold similar views. I only reiterate them in support of my 
main thesis – creating the foundations of comprehensive national economic 
strength within fifteen years, so to maintain our strategic autonomy, enlarge 
our strategic space and create strategic parity with China:
•	 India possesses an Agricultural cropping area larger than 
China but produces only half-as-much per acre of food-grains 
on average. With an equally long history in the management 
of land and water, our ancient systems – crop rotation, lie-of-
the-land check dams, seasonal-water-collection tanks, step-
wells, village canals, etc. – should and can be reestablished 
countrywide to supplement modern irrigation systems. It is 
estimated that harnessing a conservative 15% by these means 
of India’s annual rainfall volume of 4000 cubic kms., among the 
largest for a country in the world, would be enough to meet 
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our irrigation needs to 2030. South India before and under 
the Cholas was particularly adept in the application of such 
skills. Where reintroduced in recent years, these traditional 
methods have demonstrated remarkable benefits to rural lives 
and incomes. They would provide the country quick all-round 
regeneration at low cost in rural India. 
 Additionally, we should implement the forgotten ‘Sagar Mala’ 
plan for inter-linking the northern and southern river systems - 
subject to environmental care. The returns would be unbelievable: 
countrywide flood control; widespread rural employment; 
hinterland economic activity along and in the navigable river-
routes; assured irrigation water; and inland ports connected 
to India’s coasts. Indeed, we may have no option but to embark on 
the enterprise if China implements a feared northward diversion of 
the Brahmaputra (and the Sutlej) waters (See Map below).23
•	 There is little I need repeat about the state of India’s 
Infrastructure. Its inadequate state is well-known to all. In 
23 Source: Indiandefencereview.com
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this area, as in Manufacture (below), we require the expertise, 
scale of construction and foreign funds for speed in building. 
As with Manufactures, all should be welcomed – except 
China, unless it openly, simultaneously and without regulatory, 
invisible or tariff barriers, reciprocally admits Indian investment 
in like areas. The siren-call of China’s state-subsidized low-cost 
project-offers should be rejected as a matter of policy – however 
attractive at first glance.
•	 We have no option but to freely invite all and sundry – 
from abroad and at home – to invest in Manufacturing 
in any non-sensitive field on our soil in an unrestricted 
manner, and within an enabling environment of minimum 
regulatory hurdles at the Central or the States levels. Rising 
wages are making Chinese exports expensive. We should 
take advantage, so to say, of our lower standard of living. 
It appears that our ‘Industrial Corridors’ along rail-routes 
will provide an Indian version of China’s special economic 
zones, without encountering land-acquisition problems 
and other hurdles peculiar to India. Space in them should 
be made available to all, from wherever, and not just the 
favored few at the Centre or the States – except China unless 
similar opportunities are extended pari passu to our entrepreneurs 
in that country.
 Falling within Manufacture is defense-related production. 
A policy of indigenization was proclaimed soon after 
Independence. Today, we import over 80% of our major 
weapons-systems and carry the dubious distinction of being 
the world’s largest arms-importing nation. Weapons are 
very quickly expended during war. Even if we assume that 
present-day wars will be short, sharp and limited, it would 
make strategic sense to produce most of our equipment 
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within the country. The government’s exclusive monopoly 
in this respect has retarded our capabilities. China produces 
most of its defense equipment within the country. So should 
we. For speed, variety, continuous up-gradation and access 
to fast-moving worldwide technological changes, the Private 
Sector – formally permitted now but still effectively excluded 
- should be allowed normal entry into defense production. 
This may lead to the growth of Indian ‘arms lobbies’ – but 
better internal arms lobbies than foreign-import lobbies.
•	 Education (and Health) is the sine qua non for a skilled work-
force. No one has analyzed the need for higher investment in 
this (these) area(s) more persuasively than Nobel Laureate, 
Professor Amartya Sen. I desist from trying to improve or 
add to his erudite advocacy in this area of social investment 
– except to highlight that, according to medical accounts 
almost 70% of public-health problems in India originate in 
contaminated drinking water. Merely ensuring relief in this 
respect would, at modest cost, provide a substantial jump in 
the health standards of our population. My only demurral with 
Professor Amartya Sen is that the tasks in this area of endeavor be 
pursued by way of empowerment and not entitlement.
•	 Finally, India’s trade with China needs to be re-cast in a 
different mold. Currently, we bear the iniquitous transfer 
of a net $US40 billion to China’s already bulging foreign-
exchange holdings – or almost half-a-trillion dollars over 
a ten-year period. Despite periodic requests to buy more 
from us, the Chinese – perhaps honestly – state that India 
has little exportable they need except iron ore and sand. 
In fact, the augury is that our trade imbalance with China 
is likely to increase. In normal trade relations that should 
not matter as intervening imbalances are usually sorted 
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out by the expectation of values-in-trade equalizing over 
time. That would remain a chimera given India’s structural 
manufacturing deficiencies coupled with China’s generally 
predatory mercantilist regime. Some have suggested 
increased Chinese investment in India as a means to ‘balance’ 
the outflow of funds from India to China, ignoring the fact 
that once the investments are made there would arise a 
greater level of transfer-values back to China. The argument 
that increased trade despite continuing imbalances would 
still occasion better political relations by enmeshing the 
two economies does not follow in the present phase of 
India-China interactions. Indian exports are a blip in the 
more-than-a-trillion-dollar annual world trade figures of 
China. They could be easily replaced by supplies from other 
countries where China has leased mines and natural-resource 
deposits worldwide.
•	 In the US and Europe, where whole segments of manufacturing 
capacities have been hollowed out by less-expensive Chinese 
imports, innovative means are being implemented to stem 
inflows from China. Within the trade regime of the WTO, 
the EU has introduced the concept of ‘trade justice’ to raise 
tariffs or otherwise limit the volume of Chinese imports. 
The Americans have always had a plethora of rules and 
indirect means to restrict entry of goods into the US 
whenever they so choose. India should be similarly creative 
in imposing restrictions to suit its ground reality – especially 
if international trade competitiveness has been rendered 
structurally unfair to us, financially and economically.
•	 In the absence of some such combination of policies as envisaged in 
AIME, I hazard the perception that India will unceasingly teeter 
at the edge of an insolvency precipice similar to that confronted in 
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1991; and, thereby, a continuous strategic and military trap similar 
to the one faced in 1962 at the hands of China.
One can be prescriptive, but not predictive. A coordinated focus on 
implementing AIME (and rearranging our Trade Regime) is well within our 
means, constraints, abilities and fractious politics, as well within a time-frame 
of fifteen years. It would presume some minimal consensus on national 
goals among our major contending political parties at the Center 
and in the States. If that appears impossible in our national Tower 
of Babel contentions, then powerful but visionary individual leaders 
of whichever political persuasion – could be approached at the State 
level and enjoined to implement AIME policies within their States. 
Our federal structure provides a fair measure of constitutional power 
to the States of the Union and that power has increased in practice 
in recent years. Many of our State leaders are now willing and able 
to persuade – or defy and bend - the Centre to their ways in matters 
of selecting policies suited to their State’s preferences. Uniformly-
conceived but voluntary State implementation of AIME policies – 
even if dis-aggregated to begin with - could by successful example 
encourage the initially uninterested states to adopt the same policies.
Summation
The burden of my narrative so far has been to assess India’s historical 
past for understanding the antecedents of our present behavioral 
inspirations. Thereafter, the similarities and differences between 
India and China are analyzed as influencing their present behavior 
towards each other and the world. An intervening discourse then 
attempts to suggest the economic and political premises by which the 
two countries’ interacted with the given postwar international system 
– particularly economically since the Bretton Woods Agreement, 1944. 
While both underwent differing political and economic vicissitudes 
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– and have achieved great all-round success for a billion people 
each despite hurdles  – India faltered in ‘working’ the international 
economic system commensurate to China in benefit. That misstep 
has led to the present situation where India’s economy is plateaued 
internally and externally. The secular and ‘natural’ process of growth 
will not stop given the existing structure,  size and policies attending 
India’s current two-trillion-dollar real national economy, but at 
around 5-6% per annum their cumulative impact will be insufficient 
to raise the country to the next level, except very slowly, haphazardly 
– and inadequately in comparison to China. Mundane though 
it seems, re-energizing with AIME-like policies is an imperative 
necessity for acquiring: national strength to maintain our democracy, 
provide a higher rate of development and employment, and create 
a defense capability on a dynamically-evolving if asymmetric par 
with China. The pre-conditions for ‘smart’ achieving of all our goals 
between 2015 and 2030 are focus and speed. 
Creating Strategic Parity: India in the Interregnum, 2015-2030
Chairman Mao is reported to have expressed his idea of the geographic 
role of Tibet as constituting China’s palm whose five fingers - Ladakh, 
Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and NEFA/Arunachal Pradesh - awaited 
liberation by his country. Another of his pronouncements was that 
it was not for China to be passive but to make the enemy passive. 
While India and China have moved on since then and the world has 
also changed, Indian planners would be well-advised to remember 
the import of the two quotes: as part of the larger picture governing 
the whole of our northern borders; and as part of the psychological 
aspects of overall strategy that may be applied by an adversary.
The following three assumptions appear reasonable in the larger 
India-China strategic context:
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•	 Two or three nuclear-weapon-and-delivery-system-capable 
states are unlikely to enter into long wars as any one of 
them may resort to WMD-use earlier than estimated. The 
preceding unpredictability would be exacerbated if the three 
nuclear-armed states exist in uneasy intra-relationships.
•	 Short, sharp and quickly-terminated fait accompli wars 
employing overwhelming force for limited gains along 
border areas are possible. The goal would be to establish facts 
on the ground prior to any type of international intervention.
•	 Major and minor states would stay out of the conflict 
whatever the form or level of their relationships with any one 
or all of the two or three embroiled states. All states could 
be expected to intervene only if their core national interests 
are directly threatened.
Much has been written – and advised in the print media to our 
policymakers – on the circumstances surrounding the recent Chinese 
ingression April 15 – May 5, 2013 in the DOB sector of Ladakh (and 
again recently). I have gone through numerous articles on the subject, 
many by our leading analysts and defense experts – as well think-
tanks like the Vivekananda International Foundation, Takshashila 
Institute, Observer Research Foundation, Centre for Policy Research, 
South Asian Idea , Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, et. al., 
and journals such as the Indian Defence Review, Bharat Rakshak, 
etc.; as well the general news and print media. Collectively, these are 
informative and explanatory of our major problem with China, and 
along India’s northern borders – tactically, strategically, politically 
and diplomatically.   I summarize their views as follows: 
•	 An extended major war between India and China is unlikely 
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but until the borders are demarcated on the ground, incidents 
like the recent one will recur.
•	 While we adopt a defensive stance, the initiative for activation 
of border-level crises will remain with the Chinese.
•	 The Chinese have developed the whole Tibet Autonomous 
Region (TAR) area into an integrated military base 
comprising excellent road, rail and air communications along 
with in-place strategic nuclear and conventional mobile 
forces including 3-500,000 troops rapidly deployable at any 
and many points along the border as and when required. 
The forces can also be swiftly augmented by emergency 
air-mobile divisions. The accompanying (incomplete but 
publicly-available) map, published by the Central Tibetan 
Administration in Dharamsala, gives an idea of the in-situ 
situation (See Map below).24
•	 Apparently, the Chinese have also developed a village–size 
scale model of the Ladakh-Aksai Chin area for training their 
combat personnel. It stands to reason that they must have 
done so also for the Arunachal Pradesh approaches from 
their TAR side.
24 Source: Central Tibetan Administration, Dharamsala (from: indiandefencereview.
com). This is a map of the year 2005. Much has been added to Chinese offensive 
capabilities in-place in Tibet since then. For a current written update, see: Major 
General Afsar Karim, in:  indiandefencereview.com, 25 February, 2013. I have 
not been able to locate from open sources a current map of China’s military 
deployments in Tibet. Read also: General V.P. Malik, India China War 1962 
Lessons and Way Forward, spsmai.com 
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•	 GOI has plans for a steady up-gradation of infrastructure on 
our side of the contentious boundary line and has already 
undertaken steps to activate a number of border airfields with 
front-line long-range fighter aircraft (Sukhoi 30s), Brahmos 
missile batteries, accelerated border-roads development, the 
creation of a Mountain Strike Corps (recently approved), and 
the eventual availability of approximately 220,000 troops for 
our border defenses. Our military chiefs have also warned 
of the need to prepare for the contingent possibility of a 
collusive two-front war involving Pakistan and China.
•	 Despite plans and projects our northern and northeastern 
defenses currently remain inadequate to the potential 
military challenge already posed by Chinese capabilities 
in the TAR area. Our effort remains tardy and beset with 
continued delays and inefficiency in implementation, e.g. the 
proposal for creating a Mountain Strike Corp took ten years 
to be approved, - and will be assembled over seven years.
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Expert opinion also suggests that the following responses be 
undertaken:
1. Seek an early delineation of the border by both sides.
2. Shore up our defenses and infrastructure with greater speed 
and efficiency inclusive of better weapons, cyber-based 
intelligence, reconnaissance drones, real-time space-based 
surveillance, and a strategy of creating a dissuasive balance 
with China in the TAR region through a smart asymmetric 
equivalence of counterforce-application capability. This 
should include the ability for our forces to ingress into the 
TAR region at a point or points advantageous as riposte to 
any major Chinese incursion into Indian terrain.
3. Our overall strategy should be extended to include the Indo-
Pacific Ocean regions, along with open or clandestine robust 
relations with the US and Japan – and others such as Vietnam, 
the Philippines, Indonesia – all increasingly perturbed at China’s 
aggressive assertions in the South China Sea and adjoining areas.
It is for our political and operational planners to assess, select and 
implement from among the preceding diplomatic and military 
options – urgently through focused and speedy implementation within 
the years 2015-2030. The combined political-strategic-military-economic 
planning would obviously synchronize the short, medium and long 
term in creating the basis for a dynamically-evolving strategic parity 
with our northern neighbor within the fifteen-year period. 
Despite our increased current capabilities, tactically we are in no 
better a position on our northern borders than in 1962. China’s 
permanent ‘forward’ and re-enforceable deployments in Tibet are 
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aimed solely at India. China and others would be alerted to our 
activities when – and if - we begin the strengthening of our northern 
border defenses along the lines chosen. They may, thereupon, seek 
a peaceful or a less-than-peaceful response to our actions – to force 
the issue to their benefit before it becomes more problematic. India 
should be prepared and able, therefore, to engage in either of the 
two preceding reactions earlier, perhaps in the initial years of the 
fifteen-year period 2015-2030. That would require an immediately-
implemented tactical plan within the fifteen-year plan. The same is 
also possible within our present means.
The geographical topography of the northern border regions suits 
major troop and material movements on the Tibetan side. Chinese 
military formations have to climb less from a naturally-higher 
undulating plateau – and they have easier terrain to construct 
better roads. Our deployments have to traverse up from the plains 
across a series of ascending mountain ranges via tortuously-
constructed roads maintained against frequent landslides and the 
like – and easy interdiction by mountain artillery batteries to isolate 
forward positions and forces. That was our experience in 1962, and 
the mountains have not changed since then. One also presumes 
that – as in 1962 – the use of aerial combat or long-range artillery 
bombardment will be deferred, at least in the initial stages, to limit 
escalation of hostilities to a higher level. If that be so, then we have 
to find a superior tactical means as an alternative to China’s nature-
provided advantages on the Tibetan side of the border.
There is enough open literature which indicates that future 
conventional wars may increasingly involve the extensive battlefield-
use of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) in defensive and offensive 
environments. We have already co-developed and deployed some 
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batteries of the supersonic Brahmos cruise missile with an operational 
range of 300 kms (and perhaps others are in development).  These 
are reportedly already emplaced in the Arunachal Pradesh defenses. 
China has also developed and deployed a variety of cruise-missile 
types. The most notable is the DF-21AD, range of 1700-2000 kms, 
modified from one of their intermediate-range missiles, and meant 
to contest US aircraft-carrier fleets in the eastern seas from Chinese 
coast-based defense-batteries. They also possess a wide array of other 
missile systems of different ranges.
If not already planned, India should undertake the immediate mobile 
or hardened deployment of large numbers of Brahmos missile batteries 
at recessed distances along all sensitive and vulnerable segments of the 
nation’s northern borders. To deter possible collusive action against 
India involving Pakistan, similar west-facing emplacements could 
be undertaken, especially in the Ladakh-Gilgit-Siachen-Wakhan 
Sector. Further, analysts often refer to the Indian Peninsula as the 
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permanent equivalent of many aircraft-carrier groups jutting into 
and dominating large swathes of the Indian Ocean Region. We should 
factor that geographical advantage into our strategic plans to east and west by 
shore-based mobile and/or hardened emplacements of numerous sea-hugging 
short-and-long-range cruise missiles developed for such specific purpose. Our 
intermediate-range missiles are sophisticated enough. They should be 
modified into cruise-missile configurations and pointed towards the 
Indian Ocean stretches in all-sea-surface-azimuth directions. In both 
the northern land and southern sea borders PGMs would strongly, swiftly 
and at relative low opportunity cost supplement the countries existing 
offensive/defensive conventional capacities. Their cumulative reach could, 
especially, dominate vast stretches of the Indian Ocean Region from 
impregnable land stations or mobile launchers.
 
See map of the Indian Ocean Region below to visually appreciate 
our natural locational advantage.25
In the north, PGMs would signal resolve, intent and capability for 
speedy retaliation but confined only to the areas in dispute - if shown 
to be of limited range. An additional safety measure and signal 
would entail publicly professing that combat aircraft would not 
be employed in the early stage of hostilities - unless the other side 
escalated first. The larger beneficial impact would be to confine and 
stabilize unexpected flare-ups to the border region and place the onus 
of potential escalation on the adversary. Retaliatory counter-force 
Chinese/Pakistani missile emplacements would only indicate mutual 
resolve and create a stand-still equivalence. Neither side would 
have any incentive ab initio to adventurism without provocation. All 
sides would, nevertheless, have the demonstrated capacity to inflict 
25 Source: Geographicguide.net
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immediate pain in case of an attempted ‘creeping annexation’ by any 
state. Incursions into disputed areas such as those of April 15 – May 
5 and again on June 17, 2013 (and yet more recently) may not be 
entirely obviated – but it would be known to the transgressor that the 
other side does possess immediate and punishing retaliatory capacity 
against ingress at a level or for a period deemed unacceptable.  
There are two additional policy-issues which lie beyond the scope of 
this presentation, but which I raise as germane to our strategy-parity 
task - and which await future research and delineation. The first is 
the form, nature and scope of upgrading India’s strategy-premised 
interactions with major states as ‘partners’. The second is to seek a 
means to stabilize fluctuations in the external/internal value of the 
rupee within a reasonable band during the interregnum 2015-2030 
as the Indian economy inevitably grows at higher rates through 
implementing AIME-like measures. In the first instance, special 
effort should re-invigorate higher strategic relations with Russia, and 
establish them seriously with Japan. Both Russia and Japan lie north/
northeast of China. Similarly, deeper strategic ties need to be forged 
with Vietnam – and, if possible with Indonesia, both of which lie to 
the south of China. It is my assumption that all the aforementioned 
states are more than likely to be wary of China’s increasing power-
plays in their surrounding regions – whatever their current levels 
of intra-action. In the second case, a framework of artful perhaps 
below-the-radar strategic relations with the US would need to factor 
in bargained parallel support for stabilizing the international value 
of the rupee during the years 2015-2030.
Conclusion
To achieve sustained success, a special cell within the National 
Security Council Secretariat, comprising deep-skilled expertise for 
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coordinating policies in all the required fields in a time-bound manner 
will need to be assembled. It will be tasked –once overall national 
policy parameters and their objectives have been selected under 
political direction –to undertake priority-implementation. The various 
and concerned ministries of the Central and the State Governments 
of all political hues will need to be brought in and involved on a 
continuous basis: for consensual agreement, for coordination and 
implementation of policies in the national interest, and for over-riding 
internal political-party differences in our fractious democracy. Ideally, 
a National Political Bargain should be demanded of our major Political 
Parties wherein they maintain their democratic right to disagree in 
the internal political space – but consent to extended agreement on 
consensually-arrived at ‘In-The-National-Interest’ objectives.
Let me state immediately that, presently, I remain doubtful about the 
possibility of such a National Political Bargain. One could describe 
the present state of political contentiousness in India as akin to a 
constitutionally-supervised ‘civil war’. It is my duty, nevertheless 
to place it on record if India is to be prepared for comprehensively 
meeting the challenge of China. In the absence of some such internal 
political concordat – and the continuance of existing uncoordinated 
policymaking and compartmentalized ministerial activity – we should 
be prepared for the gap in capabilities with China to persist or widen. We 
should also expect to be steadily out-maneuvered by the real or virtual 
creep of Chinese hegemony in our surrounding region and across Asia.
India has a great story to tell: the peaceful resurgence of 1.2 billion people 
by democratic means – and soon a population exceeding China’s. Let 
us not fail to protect ourselves fully while writing that exciting and 
human story unparalleled in world history. 
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